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Motley: Labor Representation Elections and the Constitutional Right to Ca

LABOR REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
CAMPAIGN VIGOROUSLY: THE USE OF
RACIAL PROPAGANDA
1.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to examine and analyze the strictures
placed upon an employer's constitutional right to express himself on
racial matters by the National Labor Relations Board' during the
2
period preceding a duly authorized representation election.
Under the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter NLRA),
employees are guaranteed the basic right under section 73 to self
organize, form, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through chosen representatives and engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining (they also have the right under
section 7 to refrain from such activities). Section 8(a)(1) provides that:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(l) to interfere
with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 [section 7] of this title. .

. ."I

Section 8(c)

lists the circumstances whereby an employer's speech may constitute
an unfair labor practice by interfering with section 7 rights:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or
visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of

benefit.5
Therefore, while section 8(c) certainly buttresses the employer's first
amendment rights, it does not follow that an employer's right to
express himself is absolute.6 It is, in fact, constricted by the statutorily
I. 29 U.S.C. § 151-68 (1964). The NLRA is actually comprised of three acts: The

National Labor Relations Act [Wagner Act] 49 Stat. 449 (1935); Labor Management
Relations Act [Taft-Hartley Act] 61 Stat. 136 (1947); Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act [Landrum-Driffin Act] 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
2. For a comparison of political elections with representations elections see note
163-4 infra.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (1) (1964). 5. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (c)
(1964).
6. See, e.g., J. Cuneo, NLRB's Totality of Conduct Theory in Representation
Elections andProblemsInvolved in Its Application, 7 DUQuESN L. REV.229 (1969).
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and constitutionally bestowed right of workers to self organize: These
respective "rights" are often in conflict with one another and
constitutional friction results. Therefore, the Board, and often the
courts have been faced with the difficult problem of balancing these
independent rights. This balancing problem is often precipitated by
active electioneering by unions and employers during campaigns which
precede representation elections.
It is with the delicate balancing of the employer's freedom of
speech against the employee's right to organize in general, and with the
more acute problems posed by one party's injection of racial
statements into the election that this paper addresses itself.'
II.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS-SOME
GENERALITIES

It is not the purpose of this paper to explore in depth the broad
spectrum of constitutional issues arising out of the freedom of speech,
freedom to organize, sans interference, dichotomy. The following will
survey the historical development of the NLRB's position as it effects
the racial propaganda questions, so that the reader will have some
degree of familiarity with the multitudinous constitutional issues
spawned by a representation election.
The Wagner Act was silent on the issue of whether an employer
could articulate his anti-union position to his employees. The NLRB's
early decisions, however, construed section 7 and sections 8(l) and (2)8
as requiring not only that the employer maintain a neutral posture on
the efficacy of unionism but in some cases proscribed employer
involvement altogether.'

7. Although this paper will deal in the main with an employer's use of racial
propaganda in representation elections, the employment of similar tactics by the union
will also be discussed. The paper will also briefly touch upon the imposition of vicarious
responsibility upon one of the parties who is benefitted by a third party influencing an
election by the use of similar propaganda.
8. 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
9. See, e.g., Wickmire Brothers, 16 N.L.R.B. 316 (1939); Rockford Mitten and
Hosier Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 501 (1939). The appellate courts were not unanimous in their
support of the Board's pogition, however. In NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905
(6th Cir. 1940) cert. denied 312 U.S. 689 (1041) the court held that such restrictions so
abridged the communicative abilities of the employer that it virtually vitiated his right to
speak in this area.
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The Supreme Court addressed itself to the problem in 1941 in
NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.'0 in which it held that
"conduct, though evidenced in part, by speech, may amount, in
connection with other circumstances, to coercion . . . If the total
activities of an employer restrain or coerce his employees in their free
choice, then those employees are entitled to the protection of the act.""
This decision did not constitute a carte blanche acceptance of the
board's "strict neutrality" position, however; the Court clearly
recognized and supported the employers right to engage in
campaigning activities.
The "totality of conduct" test left to the Board, and to a lesser
extent the lower courts, the task of promulgating viable standards for
the regulation of campaign propaganda content.'" By 1945 it was
settled that an employer could diligently campaign, without coercion,
against the aspiring union with a degree of impunity.' 3 The employer's
right to electioneer was solidified with the passage of section 8(c) of the
Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.14 For an employer's speech to constitute an
unfair labor practice under section 8(c) it must contain a threat of
10. 314 U.S. 469 (1941). On remand the NLRB applying the "Totality of
Conduct" test found that the sum of the employer's activities did constitute an unfair
labor practice. 44 N.L.R.B. 404 (1942) enforced, 132 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1942), affd, 319
U.S. 533 (1943).
11. 314 U.S. at 477 (emphasis added). Virginia Electric required that the NLRB
both examine the content of the employer's speech to determine whether it was coercive
and to determine whether the speech as a whole had a coercive effect. "in any event the
NLRB was obligated to find that there was a coercive interference with the employee's
right of self-organization before it could hold that an employer's campaign speech
constituted an unfair labor practice." Note, The Right of FreeSpeech in Representation
Elections, 2 GA. L. REv. 433,436 (1968).
12. The NLRB's approach from 1941 to 1947 is epitomized by the following:
Statements containing an actual, implied, or veiled threat of economic
reprisal are coerciveperseand are not privileged. A more difficult problem
arises in connection with statements which on their face appear
unobjectionable. In such a case the Board does not consider the statement
in isolation, but appraises it in light of the employer's entire course of
conduct. Thus an otherwise privileged statement may acquire a coercive
character when accompanied by other unfair labor practices or when found
to be an inseparable and integral part of a course of anti-union conduct,
which in its "totality" amounts to coercion within the meaning of the act.
11 NLRB Ann. Rep. 34 (46).
13. See e.g., Thomas v. Collins 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
14. Amendment to National Labor Relations Act, P.L. 101, 80th Cong. 120, Ist
Sess. The text of 29 U.S.C. Section 158 (c) is set out in the text accompanying Note 5,
supra.
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reprisal or force or promise of benefit. The meaning of section 8(c) was
clear to many writers 5 who maintained that Congress explicitly
intended that the ambit of employer speech be extended and that only a
finding that the speech was an unfair labor practice would suffice for
setting aside an election. The Board, however, managed to circumvent
the above interpretation of legislative intent by holding in the General
Shoe Corporation6 case that section 8(c) applied only to unfair labor
practices and did not effect representation election issues. The Board
considered its duty to be one of insuring "laboratory condition,"
during election periods.
The Board articulated this theory as follows:
We do not subscribe to the view. . . that the criteria applied
by the Board in a representation proceeding to determine whether
certain alleged misconduct interfered with an election need
necessarily be identical to those employed in testing whether an
unfair labor practice was committed although the result will
7
ordinarly be the same.'
Therefore, the upshot of General Shoe was that a finding of an
unfair labor practice was not a prerequisite to a finding that a
representation election should be set aside. The Board rationalizes this
distinction on the basis of the difference between the remedies available
where an unfair labor practice has been committed and the remedy
available where the only finding is that the laboratory conditions have
been upset. Where an unfair labor practice is found, the Board is
directed by Labor Management Relations Act section 10(c) to order
the offending party to "cease and desist from such unfair labor
practice, and to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement
of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of
this act."' 8
The Board, therefore, has been given much latitude in fashioning
15. See, e.g., Pokemper, Employer Free Speech Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 25 MD.L. REv. 111, 115 (1965), and J. Protning, Employer Free Speech:
Two Basic Questions Considered by the NLRB and Courts, 16 LABOR LAW JOURNAL

131, 138 (1965).
16. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948). The Board, in what critics label a curious construction,
stated that "conduct that creates an atmosphere calculated to prevent a free and
untrammeled choice by the employees will sometimes warrant invalidating an election,
even though that conduct may not constitute an unfair labor practice." Id. at 126.
17. Id. at 127. See also footnote 39 infra.
18. 29 U.S.C. 160 (1964).
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remedies. Thus, where an unfair labor practice has been committed the
Board cannot only take action to rectify the harm caused by the
specific activity which gave rise to the unfair labor practice charge but
also such other "activities of a somewhat different nature which might
be resorted to in an attempt to circumvent the Board's decision.""
Where the Board merely finds that one of the parties to a
representation election has tampered with the requisite laboratory
conditions, the choice of remedies is reduced to one-the setting aside
of the tainted election." Whether this rationale is justifiable on
functional grounds is debatable; logically it is an artifical distinction.
III.

THE INJECTION OF RACIAL PROPAGANDA INTO REPRESENTATION
ELECTION CAMPAIGNS.

A.

The Problem and the Constitution.

The injection of propaganda with racial overtones is one of the
most perplexing and constitutionally difficult aspects of representation
election campaigning. Both parties often accuse the other of injecting
19. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 88 v. NLRB, 237 F.2d 20, 26-27 (D.C. Cir.
1956). The celebrated J. P. Stevens cases offer a graphic example of the broad remedial
powers of the Board under § 10(c). J. P. Stevens Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.
1967) and Textile Workers Union ofAmerica v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1967).
20. While the NLRB protects the employer's freedom of speech (although it limits
it somewhat) and at the same time protects employees from employer expressions which
are intimidatory, coercive, or threatening (such are deemed to be unfair labor practices)
its election provisions also guarantee the employees the right to exercise a free choice in
an atmosphere devoid of words or conduct which impinge upon that right. Therefore, it is
incumbent upon the board to reconcile these sometime incongruous policy considerations
of the NLRA. Permutations of the basic balancing problem are myriad. The areas are
extremely "factual" oriented and "[O]nly on rare occasions has the Board set aside an
election solely on the grounds of the content of an employer's speech which falls within
the privilege of 8(c)." 2 GA. L. REv. at 438.
[T]he Board in each "free speech" case is required to make a careful
factual determination to which the standards of the statute must then
apply. The Board must analyze the likely impact of an employer's or a
union's pronouncements on the employees with due regard for the context
of the statements, the characters and economic positions of those who
heard it; and the intent of the speaker in uttering the statement.
69 L.R.R. 186 (1968). (Excerpted from a supplementary memorandum from the NLRB
to the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Committee On the Judiciary of the
United States Senate (Erwin Committee).
The preceeding discussion does not attempt to deal with the multifaceted problems
precipitated by the NLRB's regulation of communications in pre-election campaigns.
Analysis of the constitutional ramifications of this "free speech" area of labor law is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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race-hate propaganda into their campaigns. 2' The majority of
litigation, however, has been precipitated by union claims, especially in
the South, 2 that the employer is playing upon racial attitudes and
prejudices in order to defeat the union.2 While injection of the racial
issue is certainly not restricted to the South the
resentment is most prevalent in the South, and employers there
have sought to utilize it for their own purposes. Time and again
during organizing campaigns the employer reminds his employees
that the union seeking recognition favors racial equality, and that
the consequences of union certification are Negro supervisors,
21. In light of the scarcity of authoritative information on the use of
the race issue the YALE LAW JOURNAL attempted to survey unions and civil
rights organizations active in the South. The president of the North
Carolina State AFL-CIO wrote that 95% of them in the South raise the
racial issue in . . . organizing campaigns. The Public Relations Director
of the S.C. Labor Council noting that exact figures are not available, wrote
that "the equal opportunity policies and practices of organized labor are
very often raised by the employer."
Note, Employee Choice and Some Problems of Race and Remedies in Representation
Elections,72 YALE L.J. 1243, n.2 (1963).
22. George Meany's letter to the New York Times epitomizes the problems facing
union organizers in the South:
[Iln the Southeastern states-where union organization was difficult
enough under more favorable circumstances-the labor movement has
been subjected to attacks of almost incredible viciousness because it
supports the principles of equal opportunity . . . . Racial passions are
deliberately inflamed by employers during organizing campaigns as an
anti-union weapon. In consequence, union organization has not only failed
to spread, but in some key industries, like textiles, has diminished.
Meany, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1961, p. 34, col. 7.
23. "Attempts to show that unions will favor Negroes are made before nearly every
representation election conducted by the NLRB in the South." N.Y. Times, Nov. 10,
1957, p. 57, Col. 2. But the following table "indicates that Northern, Western, as well as
Southern employers used blatant racial propaganda in the pre-election campaign
especially before the historic Brown v. Topeka Boardof Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
case.
Incidents of use of racial propaganda.
1938-48
1949-53
1954-65
North South West
North South West
North South West
3
8
4
6
13
1
2
20
3
.. . But from 1954 to the present it occurs more frequently in the South." J. Drotning,
Race Propaganda:The NLRB's Impact on Employer Sublety and the Effect of this
Propagandaon Voting, 18 LABOR LAW JOURNAL 172, 180 n. 41 (1967).
24. For example, in the Southwest and in Southern California, Mexican and other
hyphenated Americans of Latin extract are often the subject of, or target for, racial
exploitation in pre-election campaigns. See, e.g., Snap Out Binding and Folding, Inc.,
166 N.L.R.B. 316 (1967).
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integrated washroom facilities, integrated social events, and
ultimately intermarriages.2

The NLRB's position with respect to the injection of race-hate
propaganda has been ambivalent in that it has been more lenient in the
application of its standards where unions have employed the tactic than
where employers have done so. 26 The Board has been sensitive to
employer injection of race propaganda primarily because of the
economic relationship between the employer and the employee.Y7 Board
involvement, and regulation of pre-election campaigning is made most
difficult by the potentially variant national policies of "encouraging
the processes of self-organization arrd collective bargaining [per the
NLRA] and the national goal of equal protection set forth in the
fourteenth amendment.

. .

with the equally cherished first amendment

guarantee of free expression."
25. D. Pollitt, The NationalLabor Relations Board andRace Hate Propagandain
Union OrganizationDrives, 17 STANFORD LAW REV. 373, 376 (1964). The use of facial
propaganda is not solely a creature of the civil rights activities of the late 1950's and
1960's, however. In the earlier cases, blatant appeals were made to white superiority and
the social distance between whites and Negroes, See Planters Manufacturing Co., 10
N.L.R.B. 735 (1938). These incidents of racial propaganda were not peculiar to the
South, however. See e.g., California Cotton Oil Corp., 20 N.L.R.B. 540 (1940).
26. See note 139 and accompanying text, infra.
27. "We try to apply similar tests to pre-election statements by employers and labor
spokesmen, but we recognize the difference between the party who has control of the job
and the party who does not." 68 L.R.B. 48 (1968) (Reprint of Chairman MeCulloch
testimony before the Ervin Committee), where the speaker-employer makes known his
total, and often virulent, opposition to unionization, the fact that he employs the recipient
of his aired views certainly adds some coercive weight to his statements. See International
Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (1940).
28. Pollitt, supra note 25, at 378, "IT]he preferred place given (in the Constitution)
the freedoms secured by the First Amendment . . . gives these liberties a sanctity and a
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945). "That the state has power to regulate labor unions with a view to protecting the
public interest is . . .hardly to be doubted. They cannot claim special immunity from
regulation. Such regulation, however. . . must not trespass upon the domain set apart
for free speech and free assembly." Id., at 532. The NLRA lends itself to conflict with
constitutional freedoms because of its broad and, at times, vague language.
It is a very difficult area to administer because of the conflicting
interpretations which may be given to the meaning and effect of employer's
letters and speeches. The richness and protean quality of the English
language may be a boon to the poet and punster, but to an attorney latent
ambiguities in language give more pain than pleasure. Because of the timehonored sanctity of freedom of speech, and the many pitfalls and snares for
the unwary, the Board is very careful in its approach.
Fanning, The Broad View: A Question of Balance, 15 LOYOLA L. REV. 1,5 (1969).
[W]hen the employer merely seeks to engender emotions and prejudices
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Some absolutists argue that the NLRB has no business interfering

at all with pre-election racial statements by employers"9 , while others
becry the need for more restrictions.2 0 First amendment rights are not
held to be absolute. As early as 1919 the Supreme Court held that the

"[flirst amendment to the Constitution while prohibiting legislation
against free speech as such, cannot have been, and obviously was not,

intended to give immunity for every possible use of language." 31 More
recently, the Court has held that the first amendment "envisions that
persons be given the opportunity to inform the community of both
sides of an issue in a community problem and such privilege should not
that do not depend upon his power over the employees, he does no more
than any political candidate might do in exploiting racial issues or
predicting the dire consequences which will follow if his opponent is
elected. Such tactics may appeal to passion rather than reason, but it
would be just as improper for the government to draw this line in
representation elections as it would be in the ordinary run of political
campaigns.
Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the
NLRA, 78 HARV. L. REV.38,47 (1964). See NLRB rebuttal of political election analogy
at footnote 165, infra.
30. The greatest impediment to Union organizing is the captive
audience . . .only fair rule that would counteract this advantage of
employers is a rule of absolute equality. . .The law that the NLRB has
developed with respect to what is permissible pre-election propaganda by
employers . . . (causes the writer) to advise clients to avoid an NLRB
election. Unions have learned the hard way that what the Board considers
permissible propaganda can be very effective.
Excerpted from a speech by Joseph A. Finley to the Third Annual Midwest Labor Law
Conference at Columbus, Ohio in December, 1966 as reported in 63 L.R.R. 300 (1966).
Former Board member McCulloch emphasized the plight of the Board, caught between
the divergent and seemingly irreconcilable views of Dean Bok and Joseph Finley:
Our Board decisions passing upon employer's and union's election conduct
seems to draw almost equal fire from both sides. . . [W]e try to draw fair
and clear lines as to what conduct oversteps the law's restrictions against
threats, coercion, promises and other improper interference, and what does
not. Some employer representatives, however, draw up case lists to show
we are too strict, and some union lists seek to prove we are too lenient. The
court sustains us and reverses us. . . .Yet, I note with a certain pride that
in the past fiscal year (1964-65) the Board's position was sustained by the
Courts of Appeal, in whole or in part, in 79.7% of the cases there reviewed.
Excerpted from text of speech delivered by NLRB Chairman Frank W. McCulloch at
the 43rd Annual Conference of Texas Industry (Oct. 1965) as it appeared in 60 L.R.R.
135, 150-1 (1965). Sen. Burdick (D, N.D.), in defending the NLRB before the Erwin
Committee further praised the NLRB's track record when he pointed out that -49 free
speech cases were reviewed by courts in 1967 and the Board was sustained in whole in 36,
in part in 4 others, and was reversed, in toto, in 9 others." 68 L.R.R. 6 (1968).
31. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919).
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be lightly curtailed." 3 2 The problem, therefore, is greatly more
complicated than the absolute approaches alluded to above imply.
From each's arguments can be gleaned two basic premises from which
a possible solution can be formulated: (a) the unbridled use of racial
propaganda by the employer, when coupled with his dominant
economic position, creates a situation in which it can be scarcely
contended that the employee is guaranteed an atmosphere conducive to
the casting of a reasoned ballot; (b) total elimination of race-hate
propaganda without consideration of other factors violates first
amendment freedoms.
While these two positions appear to be patently incongruent many
writers believe reconciliation is possible. Most criticism of the Board's
restrictions of free speech rights are lodged in behalf of the employer,
but the Board has also restricted the union's use of race-hate
propaganda.Y
B. The NLRB's Regulation of Race Propagandain Representation
Election Campaigns.
Before the enactment of section 8(c) the NLRB had taken the
position that the employer's dominant economic position over the
employee's rendered any appeal to racial prejudice an unlawful
interference, restraint or coercion and, therefore, an unfair labor
practice. 35 The Board, therefore, considered the free exercise of
employee choice to be the paramount consideration. The passage of the
Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act in 1947, included section
8(c)3" which allows the expression of views, etc., that do not contain
threats of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. Consequently,
employers have been allowed much greater latitude to comment upon

32. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 391 (1962).
33. See, e.g., Samoff, NLRB Elections: Uncertainty and Certainty, 117 U. PENN.

L. REv. 228 (1968).
34. See generally, notes 121 through 143 and the accompanying text, infra.
35. Thus while the Wagner Act Board held employers to strict
neutrality in representation campaigns, the employer is now allowed, and
encouraged, to present the case against unionism in order that the

employee, in making his choice, may have the benefit of the views and
information of all the parties to the election.
72 YALE L.J., supra note 21, at 1246. See also, Planters Mfg. Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 735
(1938); and American Cyanamid Co., 37 N.L.R.B. 578 (1941).

36. For the provisions of section 8(c) see the text accompanying footnote 5 supra.
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unions. The Board, however, has distinguished between pure speech
and speech coupled with a threat which the employer himself is capable
of enforcing. Therefore "[t]he employer is permitted to disparage the
union's position on racial equality and to predict dire consequences if
the union is elected, but he may not link racial argument with threats of
economic detriment that he might be capable of injecting.37 Thus,
speech plus such threats constitutes an unfair labor practice per section
8(a) (l).31
In a landmark 1948 decision the NLRB held that:
In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a
laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under
conditions as nearly ideal as possible to determine the uninhibited
desires of the employees . .

.

.When, in the rare extreme cases,

the standard drops too low, because of our fault or that of others,
the requisite laboratory conditions are not present and the
experiment must be conducted over again.3
Thus, the Board has greater latitude in acting to mitigate, or totally
purge, race-hate propaganda in election cases than it does in unfair
labor practice cases. The Board has continued to uncategorically
37. Pollitt, supra note 25, at 382.
38. For the text of section 8(a)(l) see text accompanying note 4 supra.Pollitt asserts
that the Board has been more disposed to find instances of unlawful threats in recent
years than it was immediately subsequent to the passage of the Taft-Hartley
Amendments. Pollitt, supra note 25, at 382. In an address by former NLRB Chairman
Guy Farmer delivered to the New York Chamber of Commerce Labor Law Forum in
1969 he conceded such a trend and criticized the Board for it, saying in part:
In decision after decision the NLRB has gone very far in inhibiting
employer statements, finding them to be coercive, or using them to set
aside elections that unions have lost, in a context where these statements
were merely expressions of opinion or statements of fact

. . .

the Board

has been permitted great latitude.
70 L.R.R. 143 (1969). Judicial criticism of Board encroachment of employer free speech
rights is epitomized by the following 1967 decision rendered by the second Circuit:
"Congress did not intend the Board to act as a censor of the reasonableness of statements
by either party to a labor controversy even if it constitutionally could." NLRB v.
Golumb Corp., 38 F.2d 921,929 (2d Cir. 1967).
39. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). Criticism of the "laboratory
condition" standard has been both voluminous and vociferous. Typifying as to both, is
the remarks of Senator Sam Erwin (D., N.C.) before the Congress of American Industry:
The theory has been strictly applied to censure employer actions and
speech which disturb what in the eyes of the Board should be a pristine
election campaign. The slightest mis-step by an employer or his agent may
destroy the "laboratory conditions" of the election especially it seems,
when the union has lost. 69 L.R.R. 353 (1969).
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repudiate the argument that section 8(c) is applicable to election
cases.40
The NLRB, therefore, has delineated between cases where the
injunction of race-hate propaganda constitutes an unfair labor practice
and those where such propaganda upsets the laboratory conditions
which must exist during an election period (thereby justifying setting
the election aside). The latter is obviously a stricter test but the remedy
is less severe." Further analysis of Board decisions will be delineated as
follows: unfair labor practice cases; employer use of race propaganda
in election cases and its effect on laboratory conditions: union use of
race propaganda and its effect on the requisite election atmosphere.
1. The injection of racepropagandain election campaigns:does
it constitutean unfair laborpractice?
The Board has found that employer conduct constitutedan unfair
labor practice in the cases that follow.
In Bibb Mfg. Co.4" the trial examiner found that a statement by an
agent of the employer implying that an employee would have to work
with Negroes if he voted for the union was unlawful. The trial examiner
took into account the facts that the plant was segregated and was
located in Georgia.
In Empire Mfg. Co.4" the Board held that a North Carolina
employer had committed an unfair labor practice by statements to the
employees that if the Union was voted in it would mean "hiring
niggers" and that there would only be two to three hours of work per
day. Indirect threats of economic detriment were also held unlawful in
Petroleum Carrier Corp." where the Board adopted the trial

examiner's finding that the Florida employer's agent had by his
40. "We do not regard that section as determinative of questions involving election
interference." Eagle-Picker Industries, Inc., Electronics Division, Precision Products
Dept., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 44 (1968).

41. The remedies effected where an unfair labor practice is found varies. See text
accompanying footnote 19 supra. Where an election is tainted by conduct of the

employer which creates an atmosphere not conducive to free exercise of choice, that
election is set aside and a new one ordered.
42. 82 N.L.R.B. 338 (1949), modified on other grounds, 188 F.2d 825 (5th Cir.
1951).
43. 120 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1958), affdon other grounds, 260 F.2d 528 (4th Cir. 1958).
44. 126 N.L.R.B. 1031 (1960).
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statements impliedly threatened to change working conditions to the
detriment of the white employees if the union won.45
In Babcock and Wilcox Co. 46 the employer threatened the job

secrity of black employees as a campaign tactic. The Mississippi
employer's agent threatened to demote the black employees if the union

won. The Board found these statements to constitute a direct threat
and, hence, an unfair labor practice.
In Boyce Mach. Corp.47 the employer was held in violation of 8(a)

(1) because he told some of his Negro employees (the Louisiana plant
was integrated) that if the union won the election the union4 would

replace the Negroes with whites and they (management) would not be
able to prevent it.4" The Board held that the company had overstepped

the legal bounds by intimating that it might abdicate part of its
management prerogatives to the union and thereby added fuel to the
Negroes fears of discharge.50
45. This Board decision offers a good example of the lengths to which the Board
would go to find coercive threats. "It [statement that company would hire anyone if
union won] was, rather, a direct threat that the employees would suffer enforced
association with persons of supposedly inferior origins if they accepted the Union and the
falsity of the premise does not negate the threat." Id. at 1038-39. The Trial examiner
specifically and pointedly objected to the employer's employment of the epithets
"niggers, cajuns, wops, and whatnot" when describing those the company would hire if
the union won. Therefore, it would appear, inferentially, that by the use of less offensive
language the employer could circumvent the Petroleum Carriers rationale while still
conveying the same message to his employees. Thus, by evading clear cut definitions, the
Board probably made the task of culling the lawful from the unlawful more difficult;
Petroleum Carriersseems to place a premium on such subtlety.
46. 128 N.L.R.B. 239 (1960).
47. 141 N.L.R.B. 756 (1963).
48. Compare Boyce with Babcock. In the former the employer stated that the union
would replace the Negro employees and in the latter the employer himself threatened to
replace the Negro employees if the Union won.
49. The employer was held not in violation of the Act on two other charges. First,
the Board held that the employer's agent's allusions to the union organizer as a "goddam
Dago" was reprehensible but not unlawful. Secondly, the agent's statement to the Negro
employees that the Union discriminated against Negroes was held to be lawful because
"no one would suggest that Negro employees were not entitled to know that the Union
which seeks to represent them practices racial discrimination; a truthful, relevant
campaign statement is [not] to be condemned because it may have racial overtones." 141
N.L.R.B. 761 n.9 (1963).
50. In actuality, the Board probably considered the totality of statements. The
employer's constitutionally protected truthful statement about the Union's racial policies
when coupled with the predicted capitulation of management duties was enough to
transform this conduct from the innocuous to the unlawful. The Board applies the same
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In Durant Sportswear9 the Board upheld the trial examiner's
finding that the use by the employer of a large racially inflammatory
placard in his segregated Mississippi plant prior to an election
constituted an unfair labor practice. The Board indicated that the clear
inference of this poster was that the pro-integration union would
pressure the company to hire Negroes; the upshot being the
replacement of whites with Negroes. The poster also indicated that the
company would capitulate to such demands. 52 Both Boyce and Durant,
therefore, involved the employer's threatened acquiesence to union
encroachment upon normal management decision-making functions
pursuant to purported union racial policies.
In Atkins Law Div., Borg-Warner Corp."3 the Board upheld the
trial examiners finding that even though the complained of activity
itself might be lawful, it was still an unfair labor practice to threaten
employees with coercive action. The unlawful conduct occurred in a
Mississippi plant in which, although Negroes were employed, separate
restroom and drinking fountain facilities were used and in which there
were separate seniority lists maintained. The following were among
some of the statements by the employer's agent to white employees
found to be offensive: "We would have to use the same restroom
facilities. . . and that he could not just promote a person according to
his ability but he would have to go solely by seniority.u If the Union
comes in, there is nothing that we can do about it, none of us. In a
Union every man is equal."55
The Board upheld the Trial Examiners finding that the lawfulness
of the conduct did not purge it of possible coerciveness given the
standard whether the employer is playing upon Negro employees' fears of job
encroachment by Whites or vice versa. Compare this with the ambivalent standards
employed by the Board with respect to racial propaganda which is devoid of coercive or
restraining connotation (and thus does not constitute an unfair labor practice) and is
legally objectionable only if it upsets the required laboratory conditions of an election.
See text accompanying footnote 151, infra.
51. 147 N.L.R.B. 906 (1964).
52. The Board also applied the Sewell Mfg. Co. [138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962)] test with

respect to the burden of proof being on those who employ racial propaganda to show it is
not coercive.
53. 148 N.L.R.B. 98 (1964). This case arose shortly after riots had occurred in
Mississippi when James Meredith attempted to become the first Black to enroll in the

nearby University of Mississippi. This, of course, greatly exacerbated racial tensions in
the state and community in which the plant was located.
54. Id. at 954.
55. Id.
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situation where the white employees were led to believe that forced
association with Negroes would be the result of a union victory. The
Trial Examiner concluded:
In the context in which they were made, I am persuaded that these
statements were designed to and did reasonably tend to coerce
these white employees into voting against the union by convincing
them of the inevitability of these changes if the union became the
bargaining representative."

In Certain-FeedProducts Corp..7 the Board held that the Texas
employer had committed an unfair labor practice by, among other
things, threptening employees for participating in union activities
including a threat to replace Negro employees with white employees
and white employees with Negro employees if the Union won the
election.
In Lake Butler Apparel Co. s the employer was found to be guilty
of an unfair labor practice when he warned some of his white employees
in the Florida plant that they would be replaced by Negro employees if
the union was victorious. He further intimated that some Negroes
would be switching to better jobs if the union came in.
In Viking Bag Div., Slurfine Central Corp."9 the Arkansas
employer employed a small number of Negroes (mostly in the
warehouse). The employer's agents asserted that if the union came in
then the white employees would be forced to work with Negroes in the
same department. The following typifies the statements which the
Board found to be objectionable:
"Well if the union came in that the plant would have to hire more
niggers and that it [the union] wasn't for anybody but niggers and that
'61
a lot of people would be fired or lose their jobs over it."
In NLRB v. Bush Hog Inc. 61 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
56. Id. at 955.
57. 153 N.L.R.B. No. 44 (1965).
58. 158 N.L.R.B. No. 85 (1966).
59. 161 N.L.R.B. 648 (1966).
60. Id. at 658.
61. NLRB v. Bush Hog, Inc., 405 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1968). In another 1968 case
the Board cited and the employer admitted to 58 separate violations of 8(a)(l) one of
which was a suggestion to some of its Alabama employees that it would have to hire
Blacks if the Union won the election. GFA Transportation Co. 169 N.L.R.B. No. 72
(1968).
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enforced an NLRB order 2 based on a finding that the employer had
committed 52 specific unfair labor practices. 3 The Selma, Alabama
plant management engaged in several activities calculated to incite the
racial prejudice of the white employees. In one speech, a plant executive
remarked that the Teamsters Union "is not very likely to be turning
right around [after its President, James Hoffa, had contributed $25,000
to Martin Luther King's Selma, Alabama march] and [start] fighting
integration. '6 4 The court found that the evidence indicated strong anti
Negro sentiment among the all white management and employees. The
plant officials on several occasions intimated that if the Union won the
plant would have to be integrated but if the company won they would
perpetuate a segregated work force. The court stated:
Considered in isolation, the reminder of the undisputed fact
that Hoffa donated teamsters funds . . . might fall within the
ambit of privileged speech guaranteed by Section 8(c). . . . Yet

we evaluate such speech, not in a vacuum, but in the "totality of
conduct" . . . . We are aware also that permissive propaganda
standards are not "fixed and immutable," particularly where a
racial prejudice appeal is involved. 2

The court then held that when the company implied it would maintain a
segregated plant it was implicitly making a "promise of what was
considered to be a benefit.""6 The statement, therefore, was not
protected by 8(c) and clearly violated 8(a) (1).
In the following cases, the Board determined that the complained
of employer conduct did not constitute an unfair labor practice.

In Burns Brick Co.67 the employer addressed his Negro employees
and counseled them against joining forces with the union. He alluded to
previous racial troubles in their Georgia city and cautioned them
against joining a union on the basis of the alleged proclivity of the
62. 161 N.L.R.B. No. 136 (1966).
63. The non-racial violations included: Interrogation of employees about their
union activities and sympathies; the promise of benefits if they voted anti-union; threats
to discontinue benefits if the union won; threats that a union victory might result in
layoffs; warnings to some employees of the difficulty in securing other employment if
their support for the union became known; informing the employees that a sheriff's posse
was standing by in the event of a strike. Id.
64. NLRB v. Bush Hog, Inc. 405 F.2d at 755 n.2. (5th Cir. 1968).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 80 N.L.R.B. 389 (1948).
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townspeople to engage in racial rioting. He also brought in local
ministers to speak to the employees about the danger of riots which
might be precipitated by a union victory. The Board in overturning the
trial examiner held that such statements were not proscribed by the Act
since they contained no direct or implied threat of economic reprisal or
a promise of benefit. s
In American Thread Co. 9 the Union alleged that the employer
had committed an unfair labor practice by stating that the union
advocated racial integration in all aspects of social and business life. In
addition, the employer intimated that a union victory would result in
whites working with Negroes in their Georgia plant. He also stated that
a union victory would only work to the benefit of union leaders. The
Board held that although it deplored such slurs they did not, of
themselves, constitute a violation of 8(a) (1).71
In Model Mill Co. 71 the Tennessee plant's president presented a
graphic illustration of what would insure from a union victory. He
directed a Negro employee to assume a position behind his desk and
asked the white employees if they would like to have someone come in
and tell them how to run their home. The Board, however, upheld the
trial examiner's finding that such conduct was within the ambit of
section 8(c) protection.
In Snap-Out Binding and Folding Inc.7 2 the Board held the
employer could lawfully quote out of a magazine an article to his
68. Perhaps if the employer had hinted at his active participation in such riots the
Board would have been constrained to find at least an upset of the requisite laboratory
conditions. See discussion of third party involvement in representation election at text
accompanying footnotes, infra. 144-48.
69. 84 N.L.R.B. 593 (1949), enforced, 188 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1951) (per curiam).
70. It is difficult, at best, to reconcile this decision with many decisions in which an
unfair labor practice was held to have been committed. Especially arduous is
reconciliation of this case with Bush Hog. In the latter the court held the employers
statement that a change in working conditions would occur if the union won but would
not if the company won, constituted an implied promise of benefit. Factually, Bush Hog
can be distinguished on the basis of the multitudinious unfair practices committed by
that employer. Logically, however, Bush Hog and American Thread are strange bed
mates. Practically, the variant approaches could be explained away on the basis of the
difference in year of decision (and, hence, difference in Board composition) or on the
basis of a gradual hardening of attitude about the use of race-hate propaganda by the
Board.
71. 103 N.L.R.B. 1527 (1953), enforced, 210 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1954) (per curiam).
72. 166 N.L.R.B. 316 (1967).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss3/4

16

Motley: Labor Representation Elections and the Constitutional Right to Ca
[Vol. 23
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

employees, in which the organizing union was said to have
discriminated against Negroes and Mexicans.
In Bonwit Teller, Inc.73 the Board found the employer in violation
of 8(a) (1) but not because he had made certain racially oriented
statements. The Board held that the Chicago, Illinois store's general
manager acted within his section 8(c) rights when he told certain Negro
non-selling employees that the non-selling unit sought by the union was
a segregated unit and that the employees would thereby be excluding
themselves from the rest of the employees by promoting this union
drive. The Board reasoned that the employer's appeal was posited upon
his desire to retain the racially (and functionally) integrated character
of the store-wide unit and therefore were not irrelevant inflammatory
appeals to racial prejudice.74
In Southwire Co. v. NLRB 75 the Fifth Circuit considered the
question of whether or not the employer's use of the film "and Women
Must Weep" constituted a threat of reprisal such that an unfair labor
practice would have been committed. The Board had found the film
violative of section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 6 "The same film had been
considered on three prior occasions. In two cases elections were set
aside based on the fact the film was exhibited by the employer to the
employees in mass meetings during election campaigns. . . "7 Those
decisions were posited upon the film's transgression of the laboratory
conditions required during an election campaign. In the instant case,
however, the showing of the film was not related to an election
campaign. (It was being utilized here as part of an orientation program
for new employees.) Therefore, the film must contain a threat of
reprisal or force or no unfair labor practice can be found.
The court pointed out that no law required "an employer to
withhold knowledge of its opposition to unionization" and further that
the nature and content of the film, the emotional impact of the film and
73. 170 N.L.R.B. No. 55 (1968).

74. The employer was motivated by a desire not so much to better the lot of the nonselling employees, but to maintain the storewide unit which was conducive to smoother
labor relations. By departmentalizing the employees, the Union would have balkanized
the employer's collective bargaining efforts among various unit factions. His motivation,
therefore, was mostly economic and administrative in nature.
75. 383 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1967).
76. Southwire Co., 159 N.L.R.B. 32 (1966).
77. 383 F.2d at 238.
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the fact that the employees constituted a captive audience "must be
measured against Respondent's right to free speech under the First
Amendment and under section 8(c). .

..

"I'

The court stated that the right of free speech in an industrial
society must be balanced against the employees section 7 bestowed
right to self organize. The court reasoned that an election campaign is
an adversary proceeding and, therefore, not impartial, and that
Congress had set a limit on the right of free speech and that limit was
set in section 8(c). The court held, therefore, that there was insufficient
proof to establish that the film constituted such a threat. The court
concluded by stating that "we do not believe that free speech is limited
to non-emotional or non-impact speech . .

.

.We thus do not reach

the legal question of whether and to what extent factual
misrepresentations may limit free speech." 79
In Block-Southland Sportwear Inc.s0 the Board found that the

employer had not committed an unfair labor practice"1 by virtue of the
statement of one of their supervisors, who herself was a Negro, to a
Negro employee (who was wearing a union pin) that the union was for
whites and not Negroes. The statement was said to be an expression of
the supervisor's own personal views. This is not to infer that employers
can circumvent the intendments of the Act by shifting the onus to its
hirelings. In fact, as shall be pointed out later,12 they are often held
liable for the activities of parties with whom they have no employment
relationship.
2. Employer Injection of Race-Hate Propaganda into
Representation Election Campaigns:Does it Warrant Orderinga New
Election?

Section 9 of the NLRA requires the Board "to direct an election
by secret ballot and . . .certify results thereof."8 " The Board,
78. Id. at 239.
79. Id. at 242.
80. 170 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (1968).
81. The employer was held in violation of the act on other grounds, however.
82. See text accompanying footnotes 144-148, infra.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964). Mechanically, the statute specifies the following
procedures for the conduct of representation elections:
The National Labor Relations Board is empowered by virtue of section
9(c) and (e) of the National Labor Relations Act, upon the filing of a
petition by either employer, employee or union, to conduct secret ballot
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therefore, is empowered to regulate elections and has construed this

authority as granting it the power to regulate pre-election employer
speech either under section 8(a) (1) or under the Board's assumed

power to insure the election is held under laboratory conditions. 4 The
Board's assumption of the power to guarantee employees laboratory
conditions during election campaigns has come under relentless attack
from many sources. Many question the constitutionality of their
assuming such power"' and the Board's consequent curtailment of first
amendment rights via such regulation."
elections . . . Each type of election is specifically designated by the
Board, and the period of time during which it will review objectional
conduct is governed by the rules and regulations of the NLRB. . . [F]rom
the time the election petition is filed in both contested and uncontested
elections, until the election itself is held the Board will consider the conduct
of the parties to determine whether the voters have exercised their free
choice.
Within five days after the tally of the election ballots have been
furnished to the parties by the Regional Director, any party may file
objections. These are limited to the manner in which the election was
conducted by the NLRB and/or to conduct which affected the results of
the election, the latter forming the majority of such cases . . . . The
conduct by unions, employers or others which interferes with the
employees' free choice may or may not be of sufficient degree to constitute
an unfair labor practice.
Fuchs, Pre-Election Campaign Propagandaand Activities Before the NLRB, 4 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV.485-487 (1963).
84. Dal.-Tex. Optical Co., Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).
85. Typical of the criticism is the following:
While § I of the Act declares the policy of the United States to be that of
encouraging the "practice and procedure of collective bargaining" § 7
enumerates the rights of employees and specifically provides for "the right
to refrain from any or all of such activities" . . . [b]ut the statute makes
no mention of any grant of authority to establish a "laboratory
experiment" or to scrupulously supervise its operation according to the
reactions of the Board members (five presidential appointees) to various
forms of communication . . . One wonders whether the "substantial
evidence form of Court review may not unduly insulate Board policies that
restrict first amendment guarantees.
Note, The NLRB's Restrictions on the Employers Right of FreeSpeech, 3 AKRON L.
REv. 206, 210 (1970).
86. 1 now charge the Board with a serious offense and it is this: That
without ever having had the courage to say so expressly and frankly, it has
proceeded on the premise that the employer does not have a legal right to
oppose the unionization of his employees. It finds him guilty when he
exercises his right of free speech to express his views on unionization.
Bureau ofNational Affairs, 1966 Labor Relations Yearbook 155-156.
The laboratory condition standard places wide discretion on the Board to
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Perhaps it would be better to begin a discussion of the NLRB's
policy with respect to the employer's use of race-hate propaganda by
summarizing what their present position is. The NLRB neither
prohibits all use of race hate tactics nor does it always condone it as an
exercise of constitutional rights. The Board engages in a teleological
analysis of the purpose of the employer's tactics: if its sole purpose is to
exacerbate racial tensions and thereby derive the fruits of racial
prejudice it is unlawful; on the other hand, truthful apprising the
employees of the union's racial position (be it informing white's that
the union is pro-integration or pointing out to Negroes that the Union
discriminates) is always allowable. In the first instance, even if the sole
purpose is to inflame racial tensions, single epithets or isolated slurs are
usually permissible. In the second situation, the statement of the
union's racial position will be permissible even though the statement
itself has racial roots or panders to racial prejudice if it is in some way
apposite to the choice before the employees. But the burden of proof
here will be upon the party availing himself of the use of racial
propaganda to establish that the racial statement is both germane and
truthful. Having drawn conclusions, the premises must be expounded.
In general, although the NLRB has assumed the powerto regulate
union campaigns, it is chary of using that power:
In the ordinary election, the NLRB refrains from utilizing its
censoring power. Perhaps out of necessity, the Board relegates the
assessment of electioneering propaganda to the good sense of the
voters. . . . Thus the NLRB maintains a fairly consistent handsoff policy in policing its representation elections if the union has
the opportunity to reply and the employees can evaluate the
87
charges, the Board will not overturn the election results.
While the unions have annually carped about employers use of racebegin with, and the standard is rendered even more uncertain by the
continuing turnover in Board membership. President Nixon will appoint
three board members between 1969 and 1971, and this may mean that the
agency attitude toward these first amendment matters will be modified.
Query: Should these fundamental freedoms be dependent for their
expansion or contraction upon the political philosophy of presidential
appointees who serve for a five year term?
3 AKRON L. REV. supra note 85, at 213.

87. Pollott, supra note 25, at 390-91. The writer notes that the NLRB discards its
hands-off policy when the union's opportunity to rebut and the voters ability to discern
obvious propaganda are absent. He then categorizes five situations where the employees
can't recognize propaganda in its true light:
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hate propaganda and have asked for an absolute ban on its use"8 the
NLRB has not been swayed. Instead, the NLRB has traditionally
treated it in the same manner as any other propaganda.
It is necessary at the outset to delineate between NLRB treatment
of the problem before the landmark case of Sewell Mfg. Co.' a and its
approach thereafter. Proceeding chronologically, in Southern Car and
Mfg. Co. 8 the racial issue was tied to a direct threat to job security and
the Board, therefore, set the election aside.8 In Westinghouse Electric
Corp."2 the employer apprised his white employees of the union's prointegration policy and their attendant disregard for race in their
seniority lists. The Board held the North Carolina employer's
statement was within the ambit of section 8(c)'s protection.
In Meade-Atlanta Paper Co.1 3 the Board held the Georgia
employer's comparison of the Negro to white ratio in his plant with
those of unrecognized plants in their area (which he said had higher
ratios) was permissible. In Chock Full O'Nuts' the Board refused to
set aside an election where a Negro official of the plant told other
Negroes that his position in the company had fostered jealous whites
attempts to unionize the plant.
In Sharnay Hosiery Mills Inc."5 the Board was forced to address
itself to the issue of whether the inclusion of race propaganda in a preelection campaign would, per se, justify setting an election aside. The
a.

Deliberate falsehoods about material matters which the opponent

can't answer.
b. Use of forged materials and other campaign trickery.

c.

Use of bribes or threats.

d.

Elections in a general atmosphere of confusion and fear.

e. Use of indefensible and reprehensible tactics.
Id. at 391-394. The injection of race bate propaganda is most readily accommodated
within category "e" above.
88. They argue, for example, that "the racial question in the South today is. .. so
emotional a problem that it is impossible to provide for reasoned choice if the race issue

is injected ..

" Pollett, supra note 38, at 395.

89. 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
90. 106 N.L.R.B. 144 (1953).
91. An appeal was made to the Alabama plants' Negro majority to support the

company. Accompanying this appeal was a thinly concealed prediction of job loss if the
Union was voted in.
92.
93.
94.
95.

118
120
120
120

N.L.R.B.
N.L.R.B.
N.L.R.B.
N.L.R.B.

364 (1957).
832 (1958).
1296 (1958).
750 (1958).
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company had circulated a letter stating that the union favored racial
integration and had, in fact, supplied legal assistance in the school
desegregation cases. The company dispassionately and accurately (they
had supported their statements with factual evidence) disseminated this
information in a North Carolina mill town. Upon losing the election
the union protested the injection of race into the campaign. The Board
ruled, however, that they had in the past "relied on the good sense of
the voters to evaluate the statements of the parties . .

.

. [T]he

statements here were temperate and factually correct. They, therefore,
afforded no basis for setting aside the results of the election.""8
The final pre-Sewell case was Bonnie Francis Lingerie 15 R.C.

2395 (NLRB 1962) (unreported). Located in Mississippi
approximately 10% of the work force of the plant was Negro. A local
businessman told the white employees that unionization would result in
Negroes replacing white workers. Subsequent to that talk, but shortly
before the day of election, a dozen Negroes entered the plant
employment office to apply for jobs. The applicants while in the
employment office were in sight of all the white workers. The employer
denied any complicity in the matter and, in fact, accused the union of
sending them. (In actuality the businessman had sent them). The
union's objections to the election were overruled; the Board cited
97
Sharnay Hosiery as precedent.
The twin decisions of Sewell Mfg. Co." and Allen MorrisonSign

Co. 9 in 1962 have resulted in waves of criticism being visited upon the
NLRB.10 The election in Sewell took place in Georgia. Prior to the
96. Id. at 751.
97. For a detailed discussion of employer liability for the acts of non-employees
which play upon the prejudice of his employees, see the text accompanying notes 144-48,
infra.
98. 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
99. 138 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962).
100. That criticism runs the gamut from Polletts' assertion that the "Board labored
mightily . . .only to bring forth a mouse," (Pollitt supra note 25, at 400) to the
following scathing critique:
Sewell and Allen-Morrison represent the Board's maiden voyage into the
emotional nature and effect of campaign propaganda. In Sewell the Board
believed it had identified and isolated "inflammatory" race propaganda
...in Allen-Morrison the NLRB believed it had discovered the true
nature of a factual, germane and temperate presentation of the union's race
policy .... The failure of this excursion into a wonderland of prediction
and surmise which appears to lie beyond the Board's expertise is borne out
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election the employer began disseminating by mail virulent anti-union
literature depicting the union as being heavily Negro oriented and prointegration. Included in the literature were: monthly editions of
Militant Truth, an anti-union racist newspaper; a picture of an
unidentified Negro man dancing with an unidentified white woman
captioned, "The CIO Strongly Pushes and Endorses the Fair
Employment Practices Commission"; a reprint of a similar picture
which had appeared in a Mississippi newspaper with the caption,
"Union Leader James B. Carey Dances with a Lady Friend;" two days
prior to the election a letter was sent to all the employees outlining
reasons why the employer would vote against the union if he were
permitted to vote (of note was the employer's expression of distaste to
paying "assessments so the Union can promote its political objectives
such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People ..

. .")"

The Board concluded from the evidence in Sewell

that the employer had effectively prevented a reasoned choice by
intentionally seeking to "exacerbate racial feelings by irrelevant,
inflammatory appeals ....

,0

The Board, in sustaining the union's argument that the election
should be set aside because the employer embarked upon a deliberate
calculated course of appeal to racial prejudice which "created
conditions which made impossible a reasoned choice .

. . ."

held that

"[A] deliberate appeal to such prejudice is not intended or calculated to
encourage the reasoning faculty .

. .

. [T]he employer's propaganda

directed to race exceeded permission [sic] limits and so inflamed and
tainted the atmosphere . . . that a reasoned [choice] . . . was an
impossibility."'
The Board made clear its intention to distinguish between
permissible electoral propaganda and appeals whose only purpose is to
inflame the racial feelings of the voters. However, it is not just because
a statement has racial overtones or caters to racial prejudice that it is
by a closer examination of these two cases. A comparison of the
propaganda in Sewell with that in Allen-Morrison demonstrates the
unworkability of the common sense distinction between rational and
irrational appeals as applied to such emotionally laden issues as race,
Note, Employee Choice and Some Problems of Race and Remedies in Representation
Campaigns,72 YALE L.J., supra note 2 1, at 1252.
101. 138 N.L.R.B. at 67.
102. Id. at 72.
103. Id. at 70, 71, 72.
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condemned; it must also be truthless and intemperate and devoid of a
legitimate purpose. 101 It further articulated its function with respect to
the conducting of elections to be one in which
the employees have the opportunity to cast their ballots for or
against a labor organization in an atmosphere conducive to the
sober and informed exercise of the franchise, free not only from
interference

. . .

but also from other elements which prevent or

impede a reasoned choice. '15
The Allen-Morrison election took place in Virginia. The
employer's pre-election activities included the mailing of a lengthy
letter, part of which discussed the union's position on the race question
in which he quoted from the union's pro-integration Amicus Curae
brief submitted in Brown v. Board of Educationand alluded to a large
donation from the union to the NAACP, the letter concluded with the
following:
Whether you believe in segregation or integration . . . is a
question for you to decide . . . .The company considers this a

matter for each individual to decide. The national unions on the

other hand . . .have actively promoted integration . .
purpose in pointing these matters out is.

.

.

. Our

.not to tell you how

you ought to feel on integration . . .but to let you know the

unions, including the Textile Union, have tried to force it down the
throats of the people living in the South.'"
Finally, two days prior to the election, a letter accompanied by an
excerpt from Militant Truth was sent to the employees which purported
to prove that the national union allowed no exercise of autonomy by
the locals (in this instance the national union allegedly took over the
locals affairs because the local had voted to purchase bonds to help
finance a segregated school academy). The Board refused to invalidate
the election and held: "The employers own letter was temperate in tone
and advised the employees as to certain facts . . . .The excerpt from
Militant Truth concerned action taken by the Union in this case in a
nearby city. We are not able to say . . .the Employer resorted to
104. The Board concluded by stating that:
[T]he burden will be on the party making use of a racial message to
establish that it was truthful and germane, and where there is a doubt as to
whether the total conduct of such party is within the described bounds, the
doubt will be resolved against him.
Id. at 72.
105. Id. at 70.
106. 138 N.L.R.B. 73,74 (1962).
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inflammatory propaganda on matters in no way related to the choice
before the voters, and we, therefore, decline to set aside the election. '"' 7
Writers have chosen various facets of the two decisions to attack
but the most telling critiques are posited upon a functional analysis of
the "reasoned choice" the Board aspires to protect.' A particularly
cogent analysis of the functioning of a "reasoned choice" dealt with
the various values an employee would attribute to certain goals. The

writers conclusion was that "[m]ost appeals to race in the South are
likely to call forth a response far more intensive and less rational than
appeals to wages, hours and conditions of employment."' 9
107. Id. at 75. Whereas the relevance of the racial utterance is a pertinent
consideration under the Sewell test the United States Supreme Court has implied, in
cases where a party to a labor dispute has been defamed, that the relevance of the
defamatory statement to the labor dispute giving rise to it is not so important. Linn v.
Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966). The Linn test's failure to emphasize the
relevance of the defamatory statement has been criticized by Professor Currier who
argues that:
The duty to make further inquiry should increase in proportion to the
seriousness of the imputed offense, just as it decreases in proportion to the
immediate relevance of the subject matter of the communication.
T. Currier, Defamation in Labor Disputes: Preemptionand the Now Federal Common
Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 1, 34 (1967). The Linn decision does breathe fresh life into the once
listless alternative to board impingement of free speech rights (under the guise of
protecting laboratory conditions). By allowing a party during a representation election
who is defamed by racial slurs (for example the labor boss in the Sewell case who was
depicted dancing with a white woman) to avail himself of state libel remedies. The burden
of proof under Linn, however, is very stringent, requiring proof that the defamatious
statement was proffered by one who knew it to be false or who did so with reckless
disregard for the truth. In addition, Professor Currier admonishes the aspiring plaintiff
that "in the context of an election campaign, intention to hurt, to injure reputation, is
inseparable from intention to sway votes and thus offers no basis for differentiation." Id.
at 32. The utility of Linn, therefore, as a deterrent to the use of racially oriented
defamatious remarks is questionable.
In addition, even assuming that a defamed party can surmount the rigid proof
hurdle imposed by Linn and further assuming that he can directly link the election defeat
to the racial slur, it is extremely doubtful that he could be compensated for damages
arising solely from the loss of said election. (i.e., the aggrieved party might seek to recoup
losses incurred by increased wage costs for example).
108. "By attempting to regulate speech appealing to racial prejudice the Board
appears to be concerned not with the freedom with which the employees make their
choice, but rather with the choice that is made." Note, Restrictions on the Employer's
Right of Free Speech During Organizing Campaigns and Collective Bargaining, 63 Nw.
U.L. REv. 40, 53 (1968). The Board has called for a reasoned choice; "[a] choice is
deemed rational or reasoned, if given the goal of the actor, however acquired, and the
information before him, he selects that alternative which is most consistent with his
goal." 72 YALE L.J., supra note 21, at 1247.
109. Id. at 1251. The writer concluded that the "ultimate decision will be a function
of the value he assigns to each components included the employees expectations on wages,
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The distinction created by Sewell and Allen-Morrison has been
criticized as being an artificial one. "[I]f the offensive factor in such
campaigns is an appeal that tends to reduce the likelihood of a reasoned
or rational choice, there seems little to distinguish the propaganda in
A lien-Morrison from that in Sewell." Labelling the propaganda in
Allen-Morrison as more personal than that in Sewell, the writer
continued: "[I]t seems difficult rationally to conclude that an
atmosphere less conducive to a reasoned choice was created in Sewell
than in Allen-Morrison; if it be judged by its likely effect, the
propaganda was as 'temperate' or 'inflammatory' in one as in the
other."'t
Finally, Sewell's transposition of the burden of proof to the
speaker has also been criticized:
[Dlanger [inhering in part from the vagueness of the Sewell test] is
compounded by the requirement that the employer disprove that
he has crossed the line from permitted to prohibited speech and
that all doubts be resolved against him. This shift of the burden of
proof to the speaker is highly dubious, because it results in the
possibility that speech may be inhibited even though no other
penalty is imposed.'
job security, employer attitude, and racial relationships] and the likelihood he attaches to
the occurrence of each." Id. at 1247, 48.
110. Id. at 1253. The writer asserts, mistakenly I believe, that a minimal discussion
of race may be more effective than a concerted all-out effort. The assumption is valid
only when the recipient of the propaganda is both well informed and on social and
economic parity with the speaker. Such an assumption in these two cases would be
factually unjustified.
111. Pollitt, supra note 25, at 404. "It follows that should the NLRB apply the
Sewell rule as to burden of proof, it may well violate the protection given speech which
the Constitution makes free. Speech by which employers seek to inform employees of
union racial practices should be given plenty of 'breathing space'...." Id. at 405. The
Supreme Court is very sensitive about encroachment of free speech rights. The following
es exemplary of their position:
[A] funition of free speech under our system of government is to invite
debate. It may indeed serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest . . . or even stirs people to anger. It may strike at prejudices and
preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects . . . . [T]he
alternative would lead to standardization of ideas whether by legislatures,
courts or dominant.

. .

community groups.

Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,4-5 (1948). The Court has more recently pontificated
that "[d]ebate should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and may well include
vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks." Linn v. United Plant
Guard Workers of America, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966) citing with approval N.Y. Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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The distinction between a temperate statement which has racial
overtones (or caters to racial prejudice) and an inflammatory appeal to
racial bias, was, at best, tenuous even when drawn. The following cases,
decided after Sewell and Allen-Morrison should cast some light on the
opaque line.
Although it was a decision rendered by a state Employment
Relations Board the case of Gibes DistributingCo."' is illuminating in
that it follows the broad policy pronouncements of Sewell and AllenMorrison. In Gibes the employer intimated to a white employee that:
the employee would be placing the employer in jeopardy if he
"voted for the union" in that the employer would have no control
in the hiring of new employees, that the union could compel the
employer to hire Negro employees, and that thereby the
employer's business would be jeopardized inasmuch as accounts in
a white neighborhood possibly might not accept deliveries made
by Negroes.'"
In holding the employer in violation of the Wisconsin Act, the
Wisconsin Board reasoned:
It is the public policy of the State of Wisconsin, and also this
nation, to encourage and foster the employment of all properly
qualified persons regardless of.

.

. race. .

.

. "The

remarks...

with respect to the possible forced employment of Negroes by the
employer was an appeal to racial prejudice in an attempt to
influence the outcome of the balloting."'
The Wisconsin Board held such appeals for such purposes were
grounds for setting aside an election."'
In the case of Universal Mfg. Corp." the NLRB had occasion to
apply the Sewell standard to circumstances where not only the
employer, but the entire community, contributed to the transgression
112. 60 L.R.R.M. 1355 (1965).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. The NLRB if confronted with the same facts might have also found that the
employer's conduct constituted an unfair labor practice. The prediction of dire economic
consequences incorporated a veiled suggestion that the employer would relinquish some
of his management functions to the union. In addition, the plausibility of his fears are
suspect. The Wisconsin Board did go farther than the NLRB has gone in articulating the
anti-discrimination public policy rationale and incorporating it in their holding.
116. 156 N.L.R.B. No. 132 (1966), 51 L.R.R.M. 1258. This case is also analyzed
under the section on vicarious liability of employers for the acts on non-employees, supra
notes 156-60.
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of the required laboratory conditions. When the union began its
organizing drive it was vociferously opposed by the employer, most of
the leaders in the Mississippi county in which the plant was located,
and the local news media. The handbills and newspaper items and other
distributed literature made blatent racial appeals, linked the civil rights
movement with Communism, and threatened closure of the plant. Prior
to the election a group of citizens ran an advertisement in the local
paper in which they exhorted the employees to vote against the union
and made predictions of economic disaster for the community should
the union win. The union lost the election 287 to 272.
The Board reversed the finding by the trial examiner that the
propaganda involving racial matters was truthful and could be
reasonably evaluated by the employees and held:
By appealing to the employees' sentiments as civic minded
individuals, injecting the fear of personal economic loss, and
playing on racial prejudice . . . were calculated to convince the
employees that a vote for the Union meant a betrayal of the
community's best interests. Faced with pressures of this sort, the
employees in our opinion were inhibited from freely exercising

their choice in the election." 7
The Board also held that even though a statement might satisfy the
standard of truthfulness, it can still be unlawful if it is irrelevant. The
Board found that the employer and the townspeople were motivated
"not to educate or inform the employees about an issue germane to the
election, but to prompt them to vote against the Union on 'racial
grounds'.""' One significant aspect of this decision is its emphasis on
the relevance of the racially oriented statement. The President of the
Teamsters Union's gift to Martin Luther King was held to be irrelevant
to any aspect of the campaign.
In their most recent application of Sewell's standards, the Board
in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,"' found that the employer's
dissemination to all the black employees (180 of them) of a reprint of
an article entitled "A National Disgrace: What Unions Do to Blacks"
§Nov. 12, 1968, Look] did not exceed the permissible bounds of
electioneering. Although the sender of the article was not identified, the
117. 61 L.R.R.M. at 1260.
118. Id.
119. 70 L.R.R.M. 1359, (1969).
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trial examiner found that the article itself, and the employer's
reprinting and distribution of the article, did not constitute a breach of
the Sewell standards.ZD
3. The injection of racial appeals into a representationelection
by a union: When does it justify settingaside an election?
Further delineation between pre-Sewell and post-Sewell decisions
is necessitated by the change in Board policies and standards that case
represents. Proceeding chronologically, in the case of Pacific Maritime
Assoc.' the Board refused to set aside an election won by the union.
The employer contended that the victorious union had continued to
discriminate against Negroes and that that justified setting the election
aside. While rejecting the employer's contention, the Board left open
for further proceedings of a different nature the question whether the
Board would consider revoking the certification of the discriminating
union.
In Paula Shoe Co., Inc. 22 the Board refused to set aside an
election which the union won rejecting the employer's argument that
the union's dissemination of a handbill urging the employees to vote for
the union if they wanted to avoid being mistreated by "that Jew" (the
owner) upset the requisite laboratory conditions. The Board ruled that
since the above was the only reference made to that issue in the course
of the campaign it was too innocuous to warrant Board action.
Also in 1958, the Board held in Kay Mfg. Corp.'2 that an agent of
the union's statement to an employee that he [the agent] had been told
by the plant manager that "Negroes in the South were too afraid of
their jobs and that the white trash was too stupid to vote for the
union"' 4 did not warrant setting the election aside.
In Heintz Div., Kelsey Hayes Co.'2 an independent union hired
Negroes to pass out handbills entitled "Vote UAW-CIO," the day
before the election. The election pitted the independent union against
120. Id. The views set forth in the article were deemed to be neither irrelevant nor

intemperate.
121. 112 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1955).
122. 121 N.L.R.B. 673 (1958).
123. 121 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1958).

124. Id.,at 1079.
125. 126 N.L.R.B. 151 (1960).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1971

29

1971]

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1971], Art. 4
Noms

the United Auto Workers, with the former being victorious. Although
the handbills in question were not printed by the UAW, the employees
were led to believe so. The Board felt this inventive tactic deceived the
workers and impaired their ability to make a reasoned choice. The
Board held that an election would be set aside where one party engages
in trickery and deceit so as to deny the voters knowledge of the source
of the propaganda and stated "that the failure of parties in Board
elections to identify themselves as sponsors of campaign propaganda
initiated by them constitutes grounds for setting aside the election." 26
In general, prior to 1962, the NLRB, while deploring appeals to
racial prejudice, would not set a representation election aside absent a
showing that the statements were misrepresentative or involved
coercion or fraud or violence. 127 The Board was afforded its first
opportunity to apply the Sewell standards to a case in which the union
had allegedly destroyed the laboratory conditions by injecting race into
the campaign in two cases involving union attempts to organize two
separate Baltimore laundries.
In Archer Laundry Co.'1s and Aristocrat Linen Supply Co. 29 the

employees of both laundries were predominantly Negroes; the regional
director found that although the theme of the union's campaign was
undeniably posited on race,1 it was a theme purposed on economic
betterment and not the inflaming of racial prejudice. The Board then
drew a distinction between the emphasis on the union's pro-integration
posture as it appeared in Sewell and as it appears in Archer.
'The campaign literature distributed by the employer in the Sewell
Manufacturing campaign was designed solely to inflame racial

hatred and to engender a conflict between Negro and white
workers in a southern plant. The theme of the Archer Laundry
campaign on the part of

. .

. its agents was undeniably based

upon a racial issue but with different implications . . . The
126. Id. at 153.
127. See, e.g., Chock Full O'Nuts, 120 N.L.R.B. 1296 (1958).
128. 150 N.L.R.B. 1427 (1965).
129. 150 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1965).
130. A prime example of the tenor of the unions campaign was the distribution of a
leaflet to the employees entitled "Freedom is Everyone's Fight" in which Negroes were
reminded that they had to overcome vicious attacks by white policemen in procuring their
civil rights. Then via caricature, the Negroes were rhetorically asked if they were going to
let their boss stop them. Id., at 1429.
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literature in the instant case was not designed
to engender hatred,
3
but instead, racial self-consciousness. '
The principle distinguishing factor (other than the racial prejudiceracial pride dichotomy alluded to above) is hinged on the purpose of the
appeal. In Archer the Negroes were urged to join a union to better
themselves economically and not to act against the white race. The
central theme of the campaign was that "[ift is a simple fact that
colored workers who belong to unions are far better off than those who
don't."132

The Fourth Circuit in 1966 refused to enforce an order to bargain
issue by the NLRB because it held that literature distributed to the
employees (a majority were Negroes) shortly prior to a consent election
urging the Negroes to consider an act upon race as a factor in the
election, was so irrelevant and inflammatory that the election had to be
invalidated.13 The court factually distinguished Archer from the
instant case by pointing out that "[e]quality of race in privilege or
economic opportunity was not presently an issue."'' 3 4 The court
specifically disapproved of the reference in a leaflet to a Negro member
of the Maryland House of Delegates who was ballyhooed as the
champion of Negro employment rights. Bootstrapped to this patent
trumpting of racial pride was a vote solicitation. The court found most
reprehensible the union's reference to the "Cambridge" incidents
(referring to a racially oriented disturbance). The court concluded by
holding that the union's invocation of racial pride had "no purpose
except to inflame the racial feelings of voters in the election,"' 1 and
therefore denied enforcement of the order.
In Baltimore Luggage Co. 3 1 the Board held that the unions
emphasizing of the Negroes economic plight in a campaign was not
131. Id. at 1432.
132. Id.
133. NLRB v. Schapiro Warehouse Inc., 356 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1966).
134. Id. at 679.
135. Id. at 679. It is difficult to reconcile the Archer and Schapirocases. The court
eliminated the racial pride-racial prejudice distinction from consideration by the simple
expedient of stating that "equality" was not an issue in Schapiro. But such off-hand
dismissals of key questions only muddy the logical waters. One basis, a factual one, for
distinguishing Archer from Schapiro is that in the latter the alluded to "Cambridge"
incidents were more likely to exacerbate racial tensions since the incidents had occurred
in the recent past. In Archer, the references were made to incidents far removed from
Baltimore both in time and distance.
136. 162 N.L.R.B. 1230 (1967).
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irrelevant nor inflammatory. The Board, in gist, distinguished between
appeals designed to incite or inflame racial hatred and those calculated
to engender racial self-consciousness and to promote concerted action
for economic betterment. In citing Archer as controlling the Board
stated that "the key to the problem lies in a recognition of the
relationship between economic security and social goals." 3 The Board
condoned use of campaign material which is directed at rectifying the
historically entrenched economic disadvantage of Negroes. "The
choice of racial basis for concerted action has been made, not by the
victims who organize to seek redress, but by those who use race as a
basis to impose the disadvantage."' ' s The theme of the campaign was
racial solidarity via unionism, and this was held to be a lawful form of
concerted action. In a nutshell "a vote for the union was represented as
a vote for better working conditions not as a vote against the white
race."

39

The most recent case in this area to be decided by the Board was
Hobco Mfg. Co.' Hobson City, Alabama is inhabited almost entirely
by Negroes; the plants entire work force was Negro and the organizing
campaign was conducted almost entirely by Negroes with some
assistance provided by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
and other civil rights groups. The Board upheld the election despite the
company's contentions that: rumors were spread that the employer
would replace the Negro employees with white employees if the Union
lost; and, that the union in general sought to "fan the flames of division
between the Negro employees and their white employer" and to
"create hostility toward their white employer by injection of false,
137. Id. at 1233.
138. Id. The clothing of the white man's burden in the frock of a judicial decision is

indeed a peculiar rationale for an administrative body.
139. Id. at 1234. The Board hints at its ambivalent attitude in these cases when it

intimates that "the employees to whom the appeals are addressed are the best judge of
it." This is precisely the policy urged upon the Board by those critics who think the

Board's regulation of employer race-hate progaganda is unconstitutional. See, in general,
Bok, supra note 42. The Board seemingly is quite lax in applying Sewell's standards to

union injection of race into the campaign (all the cases analyzed have involved a union's
playing up to Negroes in order to entice their support). One wonders what posture the
Board would assume if a union played up to a white majority in a small southern mill

town (where arguably, the poor whites are not economically better off than poor blacks).
If the Board attitude is, in fact, premised on the desirability of disadvantaged workers
banding together then the result should be the same regardless of the economic
disadvantaged group's race.
140. 164 N.L.R.B. 862 (1967).
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misleading and irrelevant issues in the campaign.""' The union
countered by contending "that the reference to race was germane to the
campaign, were not designed to generate hatred of whites as a race, and
were [therefore] permissible . .1.42'

As to the circulation of rumors concerning the potential
discharging of Negroes if the union won, the Board found that the
rumors weren't sufficiently widespread to upset the laboratory
conditions. The Board concluded by finding that none of the union
organizer statements "were in isolation; all were in the context of
appeals to the employees to vote for the union in order to achieve
improved wages, benefits

. .

in harmony with the goals of the civil

rights organizations to improve the overall condition of Negroes.""'

IV. A PARTY'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTS OF NONAGENTS.
The typical situation arises when community groups actively
oppose a union which is attempting to organize a plant in their
community. The Board distinguishes between cases where the union
alleges the community groups have created what is tantamount to an

unfair labor practice, and cases where their activities have simply upset
the laboratory conditions. In the former, a finding of agency is needed
to hold the employer vicariously responsible; in the latter, no agency
finding is needed and an election may be set aside if it is found that the
community antiunion activity has made it impossible for the employees
to cast an uncoerced ballot."'
In Lifetime Door Co."' the Board found that the statements of
several members of the community predicting dire economic
consequences if the union won created a fear of economic reprisal
sufficient to interfere with the employee's exercise of a free choice. The
Board held that it was of no import whether the townspeople were
motivated by personal or community interest nor did it matter whether
141. Id. at 869.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 870. Aside from the Board's obvious empathy with the goals of civil
rights groups, one wonders why there was no mention of the totality of the union
proponents conduct here.
144. See, e.g., Universal Mfg. Corp. 156 N.L.R.B. No. 132 (1966); P.D. Gwaltnay
and Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 371 (1947).
145. 158 N.L.R.B. 13 (1966).
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the conduct could be traced or attributed to the employer. It is likewise
of no consequence that they (townsmen and employer) did or did not
act in concert.
In NLRB v. Staub Cleaners' the Second Circuit enforced an
NLRB order requiring the appellant-employer to collectively bargain
with the union which had won an earlier election. The company argued
that it was justified in refusing to bargain because the circulation of
rumors that it would discharge all Negro employees if the union lost the
election impinged upon the employees freedom of choice. The union
countered that it had twice before the election disavowed the rumors in
meetings with the employees. The Board overturned the trial examiner
and found that subsequent events had neutralized the harmfulness of
the rumors. The court noted that the "Board has been reluctant in the
past to give the same weight to anonymous or third party attempts to
influence the outcome of. . . elections that it gives to improper efforts
by the parties themselves."' 47 The court also upheld the Board practice
of "requiring at the very least that there be a 'substantial likelihood'
1 48
that the outcome was affected by the rumor."
V.

POLITICAL

ELECTIONEERING

As

AN

ANALOGUE

TO

LABOR

ELECTIONEERING

Many critics of the Board's laboratory condition standard point
to the lack of tempering with political elections as a model for future
board policy vis a vis campaign regulations.
The need for regulation of employer speech seems questionable if
one considers the dearth of regulations on speech in political
campaigns. There the proper remedy for speeches which are
emotional and argumentative is found in the strength of the
arguments and rebuttals of the opposition.'
146. 418 F.2d 1086 (2nd Cir. 1969).
147. Id. at 1088. This distinction is justified on two grounds: a. employees are less

likely to take seriously remarks coming from non authoritative sources; b. the most
effective deterrent to future misconduct by a party who is directly at fault is denying him
the fruits of his insidious labors. Hence where third parties are involved, there is no

deterrent.
148. Id.
149. Note, Restrictions on the Employer's Right of FreeSpeech During Organizing
Campaignsand Collective Bargaining,63 Nw. L. Rav. 40, 53 (1968), Dean Bok points

out that in instances of excessively misleading or defamatious statements in political
campaigns the defamed party is fairly well restricted to state libel and slander laws. Bok,

supra note 42 at 40.
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Several legal commentators feel that the Board should act only to
accord the party damaged by campaign tactics an equal opportunity to
be heard.10 The Board has rejeced the political campaign analogy
because:
[P]ublic officials conducting the election have no responsibility
beyond the mechanics of the election . . . .By way of contrast
. . . our function . . . is to conduct elections in which the
employees have the opportunity to cast their ballots . . . inan
atmosphere conducive to the sober. . . franchise. . . .

VI. CONCLUSION
The NLRB is among the most criticized 5 2 of our administrative
agencies:
"Briefly stated the policy, purpose and philosophy of the Board
are concentrated in carry ng out the responsibilities and policy laid
down by Congress. We try to follow the admonition given by
Mark Twain to a friend:
'always do right', he said, 'it will gratify some people and astonish
the rest.' ,,3

While the criticism of the laboratory condition standard is
constitutional in nature, Professor Pollitt has analyzed the NLRB's
decisions in this area and has discovered that "[a]pproximately one per
cent of all Board elections are nullified because so 'tainted'; the
complaining party defeated in the first election has about a one-in-three
chance of winning in the second election." 1t
150. One ex-Board member has written that absent threats or promises of benefits,
the employee of today is "generally able to evaluate the statements made by unions and
companies and . ..the parties might well be left alone to determine their campaign
tactics as they see fit, as in the political arena." Cuneo, NLRB's Totality of Conduct
Theory in Representation Elections and Problems Involved in its Application, 7
DuQuasNE L. REv. 229, 243 (1969). Another ex-Board member opines that interested
employees "are more likely to know the issues and less likely to be susceptible to
propaganda than apathetic voters." Samoff, NLRB Elections: Uncertainty and
Certainty, 117 U. PENN. L. REV. 228, 246 (1968). Samoff suggests allowing broad
election tactics with some procedural standards posited primarily on according the other
party an adequate opportunity to reply.
151. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 69-70 (1962).
152. Senator Sam Ervin (D., N.C.) has gone so far as to suggest that a "watchdog
committee" be established to conform the actions of the NLRB to the intent of
Congress. Senator Ervin feels that the Board's "curious interpretations of free speech"
are "exemplary of the Board's deviation. . . from the intent of Congress as expressed in
the Taft-Hartley Act." 69 L.R.R. 139.
153. 60 L.R.R. 146-7 (F. McCulloch).
154. Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections, 41 N.C. L. REv. 209, 211-12 (1963).
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While the injection of race-hate propaganda by either side is a
deplorable ploy, it is one which has been constitutionally sanctioned at
least to a degree. The best course for the NLRB is to steer clear of the
absolutist approaches suggested by critics from both camps and
instead formulate procedural safeguards to insure the victims of such
vituperative tactics at least a reasonable opportunity to reply.
To this writer the Archer and Sewell cases purport to employ the
same standards but result in anomalous decisions. The dominant
economic position enjoyed by the employer over the employee has often
been cited as the leading rationale for impinging upon the employers
free speech rights. 155 Therefore, using that rationale, the desire to
promote relative parity in economic dealings can be cited as justifying
what otherwise appears to be irreconcilable approaches to the same
problem-contamination of election conditions by the injection of
racial propaganda. However, such an argument assumes that
unionization will in all cases, and at all times, enhance the economic
position of Blacks. It inferentially assumes that in all cases non-union
workers are in worse economic position than union workers. Such
determinations are best left to those who cast ballots in labor elections.
In addition, the argument breaks down where two unions, one
integrated, one comprised only of Blacks, are attempting to organize a
predominately Black plant. To allow unfettered appeals to racial pride
by the Black union places the integrated union (and a concerned
employer who honestly believes the integrated union to be preferable
from the standpoint not of his racial prejudices but of potential
economic dealings) at a distinct disadvantage. Allowing appeals to
racial pride in such a case would relegate more germane economic
considerations such as relative strengths of the unions, past bargaining
records, etc., to an unwarranted ancillary position15 1
RONALD L. MOTLEY
155. "Raw words themselves do not generally constitute an unfair labor practice.
As Justice Learned Hand so aptly opined:
Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal
existence and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other,
but all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they
are used, in which the relation between the speaker and the hearer is
perhaps the most important part. What to an outsider will be no more than
the vigorous presentation of a conviction, to an employee may be the
manifestation of a determination which is not safe to thwart.
NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954,957 (2nd Cir. 1941).
156. For an analysis of the "values" which an employee considers in casting his
ballot see 72 YALE L.J. supra note 349, at 1247, 48.
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